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TAXATION
ROYAL B. MARTIN, JR.*
As opposed to the preceding term, the taxpayer fared exceedingly well
during this past term' of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Of particular note were the successes of taxpayers in precluding the
enforcement of an Internal Revenue Service summons, discharging in bank-
ruptcy the penalty assessed against a responsible officer for failing to pay
over taxes withheld from his employees' salaries, and overturning a deter-
mination of the Commissioner to charge as dividend income certain funds
arising out of a like-for-like exchange following an involuntary conversion.
The government was successful, however, in asserting the priority of federal
tax liens over both secured creditors and liabilities owed to state and local
governments, in imposing penalties for the late filing of an estate tax return
and disallowing intra-department lqans at the First National Bank of
Chicago for purposes of determining the bank's loan base for computing its
reserve for bad debts. The following article will discuss these decisions in
detail and analyze their impact upon the development and application of
federal tax law in the Seventh Circuit.
ENFORCEABILITY OF A SUMMONS
Potentially, the most significant decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit during this past term involved the standards
to be applied by a federal district court in determining the enforceability of a
summons issued by an Internal Revenue Service 2 agent under Internal
Revenue Code3 section 7602. 4 In United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 5
* Associate, Harris, Burman & Silets; Assistant United States Attorney, Northern
District of Illinois, 1970-1975; member of the Illinois and Washington state bars; J.D., Univer-
sity of Washington School of Law.
1. "Term" refers to those decisions published between October, 1976, and September,
1977.
2. Hereinafter referred to in the text as IRS.
3. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, IRC § 1-8023 of 1954 [hereinafter referred to in the
text as IRC].
4. Section 7602 of the IRC provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where
none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue
tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in
respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his
delegate is authorized-
(I) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant
or material to such inquiry;
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a special agent from the Intelligence Division of the IRS6 issued a summons
to the LaSalle National Bank calling for testimony and the production of
certain books and records in connection with the investigation of one John
Gattuso. The bank appeared in response to this summons, but refused to
produce the records sought or provide the testimony requested. Thereafter,
the IRS sought enforcement of the summonses pursuant to sections 7402(b)
and 7604(a).7 At a district court hearing held subsequent to the issuance of a
rule to show cause, the special agent testified repeatedly that the purpose for
his investigation was "to determine whether or not there were any criminal
violations of the Internal Revenue Code." 8 In an apparent contradiction,
however, the special agent stated that he had not formed a firm purpose to
recommend criminal prosecution, but that he was attempting to determine
"the tax liabilities [of Gattuso] for the years under investigation."
9
The respondent bank called Gregory J. Perry as a witness, who testified
that the special agent had advised him prior to the issuance of the sum-
monses that "the investigation was strictly related to criminal violations" of
the IRC, that there was no revenue agent assigned to the case with the
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care
of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for
tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate
may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place
named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and
to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be
relevant or material to such inquiry.
IRC § 7602.
5. 554 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3384 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1977)
(No. 77-365).
6. The function of the Intelligence Division, as opposed to that of either the Audit or the
Collection Division, is to enforce:
the statutory sanctions applicable to income, estate, gift, employment and certain
excise taxes through the investigation of cases of possible criminal violations of such
laws and the recommendation (when warranted) of prosecution and/or the assertion of
the 50% addition to tax in order to create the broadest possible impact on the
compliance attitudes of the taxpaying public.
[1977] 4 I.R.S. MANUAL (Handbook for Special Agents) (CCH) 9141.1 n.27.
7. Section 7402(b) of the IRC provides:
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to
produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United States for the
district in which such person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction by
appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books,
papers, or other data.
IRC § 7402(b). Section 7604(a) further provides:
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to
produce books, papers, records, or other data, the United States district court for the
district in which said person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate
process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers,
records, or other data.
IRC § 7604(a).
8. See 554 F.2d at 304 for this discussion of the district court decision.
9. Id.
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special agent and that the special agent had stated that his investigation was
"strictly a criminal investigation."' 0 Citing Donaldson v. United States,''
the district court judge recognized that a summons may be properly enforced
if issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecu-
tion. The lower court, however, chose not to find credible the testimony of
the special agent that he was merely investigating the "tax liabilities" of
Gattuso, concluding that the summons had been issued solely for criminal
purposes and was, therefore, unenforceable.
On appeal, the government asserted that a finding of a "sole criminal
purpose" was a conclusion of law, 12 rather than a finding of fact which
would be controlled by the "clearly erroneous" standard of rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 13 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding
that the "clearly erroneous" standard was applicable to either a finding of
"good faith" or "sole criminal purpose."' 4 In doing so, the court
concluded that there was sufficient evidence produced during the course of
the hearing to support the findings of the district court.' 5
The more important issue addressed in the LaSalle National Bank case
concerned the legal test to be applied in determining whether a summons is
enforceable. To decide this issue, the Seventh Circuit surveyed the decisions
of other circuits and found that a variety of standards had been applied. The
primary difficulty in determining the proper standard related back to the
decision of the Supreme Court in Donaldson v. United States,16 and a
determination as to whether the following language of Justice Blackmun
was dictum or holding: "We hold that under Section 7602 an Internal
Revenue summons may be issued in aid of an investigation if it is issued in
good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution."'
7
A conclusion that the phraseology employed by Justice Blackmun was
the law of the case results in the application of a two-pronged test determin-
ing the enforceability of a summons. First, the summons must have been
issued in good faith; that is, not issued solely for criminal purposes. Second,
there must not have been a formal recommendation for prosecution.
10. Id.
II. Id. at 305 (citing Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971)).
12. Id.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
14. 554 F.2d at 305.
15. Contra, United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 460 (6th Cir. 1973) ("the finding
by the District Court that the sole purpose of the issuance of the summons is for criminal
prosecution . . . is subject to appellate review, and the clearly erroneous rule has no applica-
tion").
16. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
17. Id. at 536.
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In United States v. Troupe,' 8 the Eighth Circuit relied upon but
misinterpreted the language of Justice Blackmun. In that case, a summons
was issued to a partner of an accounting firm for the production of docu-
ments concerning the tax liability of a corporate taxpayer. The district court
judge granted enforcement of the summons.19 Upon review, the court of
appeals found that a summons could be successfully challenged: "Only
when a criminal prosecution has been instituted and is pending at the time of
the issuance of the summons or when criminal prosecution has been recom-
mended." 
20
The Eighth Circuit failed to make the distinction between the two
prongs of the Donaldson test, and thus would grant enforcement notwith-
standing the intentions of the special agent in seeking production of the
summoned documents for criminal purposes only. The more logical ap-
proach is to allow respondents in summons enforcement proceedings to
offer evidence that the summons was issued when the investigating agent
had "formed a firm purpose to recommend criminal prosecution," 2' despite
the lack of any pending charges against the respondent or a referral of the
investigation to the Department of Justice.
Most federal circuits, other than the Eighth Circuit, have uniformly
followed the two-pronged test of Donaldson. In United States v. McCar-
thy,22 although there was no allegation that a recommendation for criminal
prosecution had been made, the Third Circuit remanded for a hearing on the
allegations of the respondent that the summons was issued for criminal
purposes. 23 Citing the District of Columbia case of United States v. Wall
Corporation 24 the court held that the district court judge must determine
whether the summons was issued "in good faith;" that is, whether the
special agent "had formed a firm purpose to recommend criminal prosecu-
tion . . ''25 The Sixth Circuit, 26 the Ninth Circuit,' and the Tenth
Circuit28 have all approved the dual standard which the government must
meet in order to obtain the enforcement of an IRS summons. And, in all
circuits other than the Eighth Circuit, such a conclusion was reached
18. 438 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1971).
19. See 438 F.2d at 118-19 for a discussion of the district court decision.
20. Id. at 119.
21. United States v. Wall Corp. 475 F.2d 893, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
22. 514 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1975).
23. Id. at 375.
24. 475 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
25. 514 F.2d at 374.
26. United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973).
27. United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1975).
28. United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1972).
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irrespective of the particular court's view of Mr. Justice Blackmun's lan-
guage as mere dicta or holding.
29
Reviewing the melange of opinions from other circuits, the Seventh
Circuit, in LaSalle National Bank, found particularly appealing the careful
analysis of Donaldson by the Third Circuit in United States v. Friedman.
30
In Friedman, the court authorized enforcement of summonses as long as:
(1) the Intelligence Division of the IRS has not yet recommended
prosecution, (2) the investigating agent has not already formed a
firm purpose to recommend prosecution, (3) the summons is not
being used to harass the taxpayer, (4) the material referred to in
the summons has not already been inspected by the Govern-
ment . .. 31
However, the difficulty which the Seventh Circuit found with the
Friedman articulation of the standards to be applied in determining the
enforceability of a summons was a failure of the Third Circuit to include
among its standards that of the good faith of the issuing agent. Relying
thereafter upon the opinion of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Zack,
32
the Seventh Circuit concluded: "Thus, it is proper for a District Court to
grant enforcement of an IRS summons if it is issued in good faith and prior
to a recommendation for criminal prosecution. Conversely, if a summons is
issued in bad faith or after a recommendation for prosecution, enforcement
must be denied."
33
Left unresolved by the Seventh Circuit in LaSalle National Bank was
the issue as to when "a recommendation for criminal prosecution" 34 occurs
during the course of the investigation. In United States v. Lafko,35 the Third
Circuit reviewed Donaldson and determined that the recommendation from
the special agent to the regional counsel of the IRS was "a recommendation
for prosecution" sufficient to preclude the enforceability of the summons.
36
However, the Sixth,37 Ninth, 38 and Tenth39 Circuits disagreed with the Third
Circuit concluding that a recommendation to the Department of Justice is
that crucial stage in the investigation which would preclude the enforceabili-
ty of the summons. a° The author submits that the Supreme Court, in
29. See quoted material in the text at note 17 supra.
30. United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1976).
31. Id. at 932.
32. 521 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1975).
33. 554 F.2d at 308.
34. Id.
35. 520 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1975).
36. Id. at 625.
37. United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 459 (6th Cir. 1973).
38. United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir. 1977).
39. United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir. 1974).
40. Two United States district courts have similarly sided with the majority view. See
United States v. Smith, 373 F. Supp. 14, 18 (S.D. Miss. 1974); United States v. Cecil E. Lucas
General Con., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 1267, 1273 (D.S.C. 1975).
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reviewing the decision of the Seventh Circuit in LaSalle National Bank,
will most likely conclude that the relevant "recommendation" will occur
when made to the Department of Justice.
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION
Broadview Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States4 involved the "tax
consequences of a merger of a parent corporation into its subsidiary, brought
about by the subsidiary's purchase of the parent's stock with insurance
proceeds received from the involuntary conversion of the subsidiary's assets
through fire.''42 Allen County Lumber Company 43 owned 53% of the
Broadview Lumber Co." The Fisher family owned approximately 47% of
Allen County, with the remaining 53% of Allen County being owned by the
Johnston family. Substantially all of Broadview's assets were destroyed by
fire, for which Broadview received insurance proceeds, realizing a gain of
some $182,000 on the involuntary conversion. In order to avoid recognition
of the gain on the receipt of the proceeds, Broadview determined to reinvest
the proceeds in property similar to that destroyed by the fire, and as a result
sought control of Allen County. Allen County redeemed all of the stock of
the Fisher family, and thereafter Broadview purchased all of the stock of the
Johnston family, with Broadview becoming the parent company of its
former parent, Allen County. Allen County then merged into Broadview,
with Broadview taking the assets received from Allen County at Allen
County's basis with no reduction for the non-taxable gain realized as a result
of the involuntary conversion.
45
The issues to be resolved were whether: (1) the purchase by Broadview
of Allen County's stock from its shareholders was a constructive dividend to
Allen County; (2) the purchase by Broadview was a transaction which
qualified as a tax free replacement; and (3) the acquisition cost rather than
the carry-over basis was the proper basis for the assets received by Broad-
view from Allen. The Seventh Circuit held for the taxpayer on all three
issues.
As to the dividend issue, the court relied upon a recent decision of the
Tax Court,' sitting with all sixteen judges, which held that a parent
corporation does not realize a constructive dividend under the provisions of
section 30447 of the IRC upon the purchase of its stock by a subsidiary. In an
41. 561 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1977).
42. Id. at 699.
43. Hereinafter referred to in the text as Allen County.
44. Hereinafter referred to in the text as Broadview.
45. 561 F.2d at 699-700.
46. Helen M. Webb, 67 T.C. 293 (1976).
47. Section 304 provides in pertinent part:
§ 304 Redemption through use of related corporations.
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extended discussion of the legislative history of section 304 and its prede-
cessor statute,48 the court noted that when a subsidiary buys the stock of its
parent corporation from the stockholders of the parent, that purchase may be
treated as a dividend to the stockholders from the parent, as if the subsidiary
had first distributed the funds to the parent who then paid its stockholders. 9
This does not mean, however, that the parent receives a taxable dividend
upon the purchase, for the "as if" language of section 304 is not the
equivalent of an actual payment by the subsidiary to the parent, and the
purchase therefore from the shareholders involves no tax consequences to
the parent corporation.
The second issue concerned the fact that Broadview reinvested the
insurance proceeds in the Johnston family stock in Allen County in order to
avoid recognition of the gain arising from the involuntary conversion.
Section 1033 of the IRC provides for a tax-free replacement of property
destroyed in whole or in part, as long as the replacement property is
purchased.50 However, section 304 specifies that where a corporation buys
the stock of a related corporation, the acquisition is treated as a contribution
to the capital of the acquiring corporation rather than a purchase. The
government, therefore, argued that the Broadview acquisition of the Allen
County stock was not a purchase, but rather was a contribution to capital,
and that the provisions of section 1033, as a consequence, were inapplica-
ble.5" In analyzing section 304 and its legislative history, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the "contribution to the capital" language of section
304 applied only to transactions between brother-sister corporations, and
that because Broadview, a subsidiary, acquired the stock of its parent, rather
(a) Treatment of certain stock purchases.
(2) Acquisition by subsidiary.
For purposes of sections 302 and 303, if-
(A) in return for property, one corporation acquires from a shareholder of
another corporation stock in such other corporation, and
(B) the issuing corporation controls the acquiring corporation, then such
property shall be treated as a distribution in redemption of the stock of the
issuing corporation.
(b) Special rules for application of subsection (a).
(2) Amount constituting dividend.
(B) Where subsection (a)(2) applies.
In the case of any acquisition of stock to which subsection (a)(2) of this
section applies, the determination of the amount which is a dividend shall be
made as if the property were distributed by the acquiring corporation to the
issuing corporation and immediately thereafter distributed by the issuing
corporation.
IRC § 304.
48. Section 115(g)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (superseded by IRC § 304).
49. IRC § 304(a)(2), § 304(b)(2)(B).
50. IRC § 1033.
51. 561 F.2d at 705.
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than a related corporation, a true "purchase" had been effected. 52 The court
specifically found that the constructive ownership rules of section
318(a)(3)(C) 53 were fictions which Congress did not intend to apply to
section 304(a).
The final issue in the Broadview case concerned the basis to be
attributed to the assets Broadview received from Allen County and the
applicability of Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner.54 In Kim-
bell-Diamond, the Tax Court held that the subjective intention of the
acquiring corporation was controlling, and that if the acquiring corporation
intended to acquire the assets of the liquidating corporation, the basis to be
reflected on the acquiring corporation books would be the cost of the
assets.
Subsequent to Kimbell-Diamond, Congress passed the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954. In section 334, relating to the liquidation of subsidiaries,
Congress set forth two separate standards: section 334(b)(1)56 provided for a
carry-over basis, and section 334(b)(2) 57 for a cost basis. The Seventh
Circuit found in Broadview that section 334(b)(2) was "intended to substi-
tute objective, definable standards for the subjective test of Kimbell-Dia-
52. Id. at 709.
53. IRC § 318(a)(3)(C).
54. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827
(1951).
55. 14 T.C. at 80.
56. Section 334(b)(1) provides:
If property is received by a corporation in a distribution in complete liquidation of
another corporation (within the meaning of section 332(b)), then, except as provided in
paragraph (2), the basis of the property in the hands of the distributee shall be the same
as it would be in the hands of the transferor. If property is received by a corporation in
a transfer to which section 332(c) applies, and if paragraph (2) of this subsection does
not apply, then the basis of the property in the hands of the transferee shall be the
same as it would be in the hands of the transferor.
IRC § 334(b)(1).
57. Section 334(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part, for the following exception:
If property is received by a corporation in a distribution in complete liquidation of
another corporation (within the meaning of section 332(b)), and if-
(A) the distribution is pursuant to a plan of liquidation adopted. . . not more than 2
years after the date of the transaction described in subparagraph (B) (or, in the case of
a series of transactions, the date of the last such transaction); and
(B) stock of the distributing corporation possessing at least 80 percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, and at least 80 percent
of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock (except nonvoting stock
which is limited and preferred as to dividends), was acquired by the distributee by
purchase (as defined in paragraph (3)) during a 12-month period beginning with the
earlier of-
(i) the date of the first acquisition by purchase of such stock, or
(ii) if any such stock was acquired in an acquisition which is a purchase within
the meaning of the second sentence of paragraph (3), the date on which the distributee
is first considered under section 3 18(a) as owning stock owned by the corporation from
which such acquisition was made, then the basis of the property in the hands of the
distributee shall be the adjusted basis of the stock with respect to which the distribu-
tion was made. . ..
IRC § 334(b)(2).
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mond, ' 58 and that the standards reflected therein were not present in the
Broadview acquisition of the Allen County stock. 59 Specifically, the court
found that section 334(b)(2) did not apply to the Broadview transaction
because the stock acquired was not "purchased" as the term purchase is
defined in section 334(b)(3), for purposes of determining the applicability of
section 334(b)(2). Thus, the basis for the assets in Broadview's hands
"received in liquidation of Allen [was] carried over from the basis of those
assets in Allen's hands."
6
NON-DISCHARGEABLE TAX OR DISCHARGEABLE PENALTY
Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act provides in essence that a bankrupt
shall not be released upon his discharge from withholding taxes which he
withheld from the wages of hisemployees but did not pay over to the United
States. 61 In In re Sotelo,62 the taxpayer, chief executive officer of a corpora-
tion, was assessed a 100 percent penalty under IRC section 667263 following
the failure of his corporation to account to the government for taxes withheld
from the wages of the corporate employees. Sotelo filed for personal
bankruptcy, and scheduled the 100 percent penalty as a liability, which the
bankruptcy judge allowed. 64
The sole issue before the Seventh Circuit was the dischargeability of
Sotelo's liability, which in turn revolved around a characterization of the
liability as either a tax or a penalty. The court found for the taxpayer,
concluding that the withholding liability was specifically denominated a
"penalty" by section 6672, that section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act provided
58. 561 F.2d at 711.
59. Id. The court specifically declined to follow a contrary holding of the Court of Claims
in American Potash & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
60. 561 F.2d at 714.
61. Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts,
whether allowable in full or in part, except such as (1) are taxes which became legally
due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States or to any State or any subdivision
thereof within three years preceding bankruptcy: Provided, However, That a discharge
in bankruptcy shall not release a bankrupt from any taxes . . .(e) which the bankrupt
has collected or withheld from others as required by the laws of the United States or
any State or political subdivision thereof, but has not paid over . ...
62. 551 F.2d 1090(7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46U.S.L.W. 3215 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1977) (No.
76-1800).
63. Section 6672 is worded as follows:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over tax imposed by
this title who willfully fails to collect such tax or truthfully account for and pay over
such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the
payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a
penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted
for and paid over. No penalty shall be imposed under section 6653 for any offense to
which this section is applicable.
IRC § 6672.
64. See 551 F.2d at 1091 for a discussion of the bankruptcy proceedings.
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only that withheld "taxes" are non-dischargeable, and that as a policy
matter, a contrary holding would "contravene the Bankruptcy Act's basic
policy of settling a bankrupt's past debts and providing a fresh economic
start. "65 Because the opposite conclusion was reached by the Fifth Circuit in
In re Murphy, 66 which the Seventh Circuit specifically declined to follow,
the Supreme Court has granted review in Sotelo. 67
ABATEMENT OF PENALTY FOR FAILURE TO FILE A RETURN
In United States v. Kroll,68 the government brought suit to reduce to
judgment a penalty imposed following the failure to timely file an estate tax
return. The return was filed approximately twelve months late. The only
issue before the court was whether the taxpayer established reasonable cause
and proved that he exercised ordinary business care and prudence as a
defense to the imposition of the penalty. Kroll, the executor of the estate,
argued that he had relied upon the attorney for the estate, and that that factor
alone established reasonable cause as a matter of law. The district court
agreed, emphasizing that Kroll was "not an expert in the field of tax or
estate reporting," 69 and that he was entitled to and did in fact rely upon the
attorney to whom he entrusted the preparation of the estate tax return.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the decision of the lower court, holding
that: "[W]hen there is no question that a return must be filed, the taxpayer
has a personal, nondelegable duty to file the tax return when due." 7"
The court emphasized that the executor of the estate had no respon-
sibilities with respect to the intricacies of the IRC, but rather had only to
remember one date, the date on which the estate tax return was due. Had
Kroll been advised by the attorney for the estate that the law did not require
the filing of an estate tax return, such a legal opinion would have foreclosed
the imposition of the late filing penalty. In the circumstances of this case,
however, Kroll's only responsibility was "to read a calendar and to jot
down on [his] desk or office records a single date." 71 Thus, the penalty will
be imposed where there is no question of the duty to file the return, and the
taxpayer is aware that such return must be filed.72
The opinion of the Seventh Circuit conflicts with that of the Tax Court
in the Estate of Bradley. 73 In Bradley, the executor was advised by the
65. 551 F.2d at 1092-93.
66. 533 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1976).
67. See note 51 supra.
68. 547 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1977).
69. See 547 F.2d at 395 for this discussion of the district court decision.
70. Id. at 396.
71. Id. at 395.
72. Accord, Ferrando v. United States, 245 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1957); Logan Lumber Co.
v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1966).
73. 33 T.C.M. 70 (1974), aff'd without opinion, 511 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1975).
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accountant charged with the preparation of the estate tax return that the
return was due 18 months from the date of the decedent's death, but, in
actuality, the time period was 15 months. The return was filed late, and the
Commissioner imposed the late filing penalties against the executor. The
Tax Court found for the taxpayer, emphasizing that the executor, Arnold,
"had no experience in tax problems relating to probate matters," conclud-
ing that "Arnold did not know the due date of the estate tax return." ,74 The
Seventh Circuit, based on Krol, would have upheld the imposition of the
penalty, because the advice from the accountant related to when the return
was due, rather than whether a return-was due. The Tax Court finds such
argument a distinction without a difference:
To sustain respondent's argument would require a holding that an
executor may rely upon the advice of an expert on substantive tax
law questions but, as a matter of law, may not do so with respect
to the requirements of the law as to the due date of tax returns-
that he must research that question for himself. We decline to so
hold.
75
DEDUCTIBILITY OF PREPAID INTEREST
The Seventh Circuit addressed the deductibility of prepaid interest
issue in the case of Resnik v. Commissioner.76 In that case, a limited
partnership was formed in Illinois on December 31, 1969, in which the
taxpayer, Resnik, contributed $40,000, representing thirty-two percent in-
terest in the partnership. The total capital contributed by Resnik and his
partners was $125,000, of which $115,000 was paid to Capital Concepts, a
California corporation, as prepaid interest for a fifty-one month period for
an interest in certain properties located in Texas. The Resnik partnership had
no income in 1969, the capital contribution was made on the last day of the
calendar year, and thus the prepaid interest resulted in a $115,000 loss, the
only expense reported by the Resnik partnership on its 1969 return.
Resnik claimed a $36,800 deduction as his distributive share of the
$115,000 partnership loss in 1969. The Commissioner disallowed the de-
duction, and was upheld by the Tax Court which found that "the prepaid
interest deduction materially distorted the partnership income" 77 and that
the Commissioner had properly exercised his discretionary authority under
IRC section 446(b) .7 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, relying upon two recent
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Resnik v. Commissioner, 555 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1977).
77. Id. at 635.
78. Section 446(b) provides: "If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the
taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable
income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect
income." IRC § 446.
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cases from the Second7 9 and Ninth8 ° Circuits, disallowing deductions for
prepaid interest.
The Seventh Circuit viewed the issue as whether "the method of
accounting, viewed with reference to the particular item of prepaid interest,
clearly reflects or, conversely, materially distorts income.." 8 1 Because the
Resnik partnership had a one day taxable year, the partnership's tax return
reflected no income for that year and Resnik individually, in effect, realized
a ninety-two percent return on his investment on the very same day the
investment was made, the court viewed the intent of the taxpayer with a
jaundiced eye.
PRIORITY OF FEDERAL TAX LIENS
Two cases were decided by the Seventh Circuit this term involving the
priority to be accorded claims by the United States against taxpayers arising
out of their failure to pay over taxes withheld from the wages of employees.
In Dragstrem v. Obermeyer, 2 Dragstrem loaned Obermeyer $11,400,
taking back as collateral through the vehicle of a security agreement 500
acres of popcorn and the proceeds from their sale. The security interest was
never perfected, however, because of Dragstrem's failure to file a financing
statement under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. 83 Drag-
strem thereafter brought suit in state court on the obligation," joining the
Weaver Popcorn Company85 in order to obtain the proceeds of the sale of the
popcorn from Obermeyer to Weaver. Weaver admitted owing Obermeyer
some $30,000, but declined to transmit the funds to Dragstrem because of
conflicting claims to those proceeds in excess of the $30,000. The United
States was joined as a party-claimant to the action, after which Weaver
sought an order authorizing the deposit of the funds with the court. Several
days later, but prior to the deposit of the $30,000 by Weaver into the
custody of the court, the United States filed a tax lien in the amount of
$25,000 against the Weaver monies. 86 Weaver then deposited the funds into
the state court, and the United States obtained a removal of the action to
federal district court.
79. Burck v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1976).
80. Sandor v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 469 (1974), aff'd, 536 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1976).
81. 555 F.2d at 636.
82. 549 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1977).
83. IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9-401 (Burns 1976) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the
UCC].
84. See 549 F.2d at 22 for a discussion of the state court decision.
85. Hereinafter referred to in the text as Weaver.
86. The lien was based upon the assessment of 100 percent penalties against Obermeyer as
a responsible officer for his failure to pay over to the United States taxes withheld from the
wages of his company's employees. 549 F.2d at 22. See also note 52 supra.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
The issue before the Seventh Circuit concerned whether the federal tax
lien filed by the United States against the Weaver monies had priority over
Dragstrem's unperfected security interest. The court held that it did.87
Although the Seventh Circuit concluded that "a security interest need not be
perfected under the UCC in order to be protected against a subsequent
judgment lien under . . . the Federal Tax Lien Act, ' 8 8 the court deemed it
necessary to determine just what type of protection a security interest need
have in order to be protected under local law against the subsequent federal
tax lien. Under one set of cases, if the government obtained actual knowl-
edge of the unperfected security interest before filing its tax lien, the tax lien
would have been subordinate to the unperfected security interest.89 Since in
Dragstrem, the government was interpleaded in the state court prior to filing
its tax lien, this rule would have accorded Dragstrem priority over the
government.
The other line of cases apply the so-called "hypothetical judgment lien
creditor" test: "Under this test, a security interest primes an unfiled federal
tax lien only if the security interest is protected under local law against any
hypothetical judgment lien creditor that might arise, whether or not the
government has actual knowledge of the security interest. "9°
The "hypothetical judgment lien creditor" standard was applied by the
district court and approved by the Seventh Circuit in Dragstrem, on the
basis that the "government does not rely on any notice, actual or record, in
making a determination to become a creditor, or to create and file a tax
lien. '91
The final matter to be resolved in Dragstrem was the finding of the
district court, applying the hypothetical judgment lien creditor test, that "no
creditor could obtain a judgment lien against property in custodia legis
without obtaining knowledge of Dragstrem's security interest. "92 The
Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a hypothetical creditor could in fact
obtain a judgment lien against property in the custody of the court, without
obtaining actual knowledge of a security interest, by obtaining "an in
personam judgment against [the] debtor in another court and delivering a
writ of execution based on that judgment to a sheriff." 93 Because the lien
attaches to the property at the time the writ of execution is delivered to the
87. See 549 F.2d at 23-26 for the court of appeal's discussion of-this issue.
88. 549 F.2d at 25.
89. United States v. Hunt, 513 F.2d 129 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Trigg, 465 F.2d
1264 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911 (1973).
90. 549 F.2d at 26.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 27.
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sheriff, the creditor could obtain his lien without learning of the action
before the court with custody of the property.
In United States v. Burczyk, 94 the defendant was appointed receiver in
connection with an insolvency proceeding brought by the State of Wisconsin
against a manufacturing company. Among the debts of the manufacturer
were monies owed to the federal government for income taxes withheld
from its employees, as well as unemployment taxes to the state and personal
property taxes to the Village of Waterford. Under Title 31, United States
Code, section 191,95 the government filed its claim of priority in a timely
manner for the amount of the unpaid withholding taxes, notifying Burczyk
that he could be held personally liable should he fail to honor the govern-
ment's priority. Both the State of Wisconsin and the Village of Waterford
also filed their tax claims in a timely fashion. Because the report filed by
Burczyk did not reflect the priority of the claim of the United States, the
state court ordered that the claims of the state and the village be satisfied,
with the balance of the assets being insufficient to satisfy the claim of the
government. 96 Under section 1929 the government sought to hold Burczyk
personally liable in federal court for the amount of those sums paid to the
state and the village.
Under Wisconsin law, tax claims may be perfected by the docketing of
a warrant in the amount of the claims,98 which both the state and the village
did. Burczyk argued that the state and the village, having perfected their tax
claims, had priority over the claim of priority by the federal government,
because of the Wisconsin statute providing for perfection. The Seventh
Circuit affirmed the opinion of the district court that "federal, not state law,
governs the priority between federal and state or municipal tax liens .... 99
The court noted that only in circumstances under which the lien had
94. 556 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1977).
95. Title 31, United States Code, section 191 (1970) states:
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the
estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators, is
insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United
States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall extend as well to cases
in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a
voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding,
concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act
of bankruptcy is committed.
96. See 556 F.2d at 395 for a discussion of the state court proceedings.
97. Title 31, United States Code, section 192 (1970) states:
Every executor, administrator, or assignee, or other person, who pays, in whole
or in part, any debt due by the person or estate for whom or for which he acts before
he satisfies and pays the debts due to the United States from such person or estate,
shall become answerable in his own person and estate to the extent of such payments
for the debts so due to the United States, or for so much thereof as may remain due
and unpaid.
98. WIs. STAT. § 108.22 (1975).
99. 556 F.2d at 396.
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been perfected under state law, and the property had been reduced to the
possession of the creditor, could the village and the state have prevailed over
the general priority accorded claims of the government under section 191. o
THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
Once again the Anti-Injunction Act°.1 has precluded a taxpayer from
attacking a ruling of the IRS which destroyed the very livelihood of the
taxpayer. °2 In Educo, Inc. v. Alexander,0 3 the plaintiff corporation de-
signed and managed educational benefit programs for the employees of its
clients. Through such plans, the corporate clients would contribute to trust
funds administered by Educo, out of which would be paid distributions to
children of certain corporate employees for college educations. None of the
funds so contributed by the corporate clients would ever be received by the
employees themselves. Through the publication of Revenue Ruling 75-
448,104 the IRS advised that the contributions to such plans constituted
deferred compensation to employees whose children received benefits there-
under. Furthermore, the contributing corporations could deduct in the year
of contribution only such amounts as were included in the gross income of
the employees on whose behalf the contributions to the plan had been made.
Needless to say, the Revenue Ruling undermined the very nature of the
business of Educo. Educo therefore brought suit seeking to enjoin the IRS
and the Secretary of the Treasury from implementing the Revenue Ruling.
The district court dismissed the suit,10 5 finding that it had no jurisdiction' to
hear the cause because of the Anti-Injunction Act.
In the court of appeals, Educo asserted the argument that because the
Anti-Injunction Act precluded suits "for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax," °6 the Act was inapplicable to the
Educo cause of action because Educo did not seek "to obstruct revenue
collecting but instead to maintain Educo's financial viability."'1 7 Although
there was no question that the purpose of the law suit was to maintain
Educo's financial viability, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the ultimate
effect, should Educo be successful, would be a reduction in the tax liabilities
100. !d. at 397. The court also rejected Burczyk's claim that the state and the village were
unjustly enriched, finding Burczyk's own negligence of sufficient magnitude to preclude
equitable relief.
101. IRC § 7421(a).
102. See generally Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974); Bob Jones
University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); Cattle Feeders Tax Comm. v. Schultz, 504 F.2d 462
(10th Cir. 1974).
103. 557 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1977).
104. 1975-2 C.B. 55.
105. See 557 F.2d at 618 for a discussion of the district court decision.
106. IRC § 7421(a).
107. 557 F.2d at 620.
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of Educo's corporate client employees. Thus, the court held that the Anti-
Injunction Act specifically forbade prosecution of the Educo suit.10 8
In the "capstone to judicial construction"' 1 9 of the Anti-Injunction
Act, the Supreme Court held in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation
Co. 110 that, notwithstanding the Act, an injunction could be entered if the
plaintiff could show that "(1) under no circumstances could the government
ultimately prevail; and (2) a basis for equity jurisdiction exists." 111 Educo
attempted to avail itself of the Williams Packing exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act, claiming that there was an insufficient basis for the district
court judge to determine whether the government could in fact ultimately
prevail. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, noting that the substance of Reve-
nue Ruling 75-448 was approved by the Tax Court less than four months
prior to the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Educo. 112 Because the
Seventh Circuit similarly dismissed the argument that the government could
not prevail on the merits, the court did not consider whether there was a
basis for equity jurisdiction, for both prongs of the Williams Packing
decision "are sine qua nons for the entering of an injunction."" ' 3
ADDITIONS TO RESERVES FOR BAD DEBTS
In First National Bank of Chicago v. Commissioner,"1 4 the Trust
Department of the bank maintained a separate trust accouni.for each trust it
administered. During the course of managing the trusts, disbursements
would occasionally exceed cash on hand, causing the Trust Department to
authorize overdrafts. To cover the overdrafts, the Commercial Loan Depart-
ment would advance to the Trust Department the amount by which the
particular trust accounts were short, carrying such advances on the books of
the Commercial Loan Department as loans to the Trust Department. Be-
cause IRC section 166(c) 115 permits "a reasonable addition to a reserve for
bad debts" to be deducted as bad debts, the bank computed its bad debt
reserve utilizing the advances as part of its loan base. Upon audit, the
Commissioner disallowed that portion of the bad debt reserve reflecting the
108. Id. The court also rejected Educo's claim that the Anti-Injunction Act precluded suits
only by taxpayers, rather than third persons.
109. Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. at 742 (quoting Enochs v. Williams Packing
& Navigation Co., 370 U.S. I (1962)).
110. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
111. 557 F.2d at 620-21.
112. Richard T. Armantrout, 67 T.C. 996 (1977).
113. 557 F.2d at 622.
114. 546 F.2d 759 (7th Cir. 1976).
115. Section 166(c) provides: "Reserve for bad debts-In lieu of any deduction under
subsection (a), there shall be allowed (in the discretion of the Secretary or his delegate [the
Commissioner]) a deduction for a reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts." IRC § 166(c).
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advances to the Trust Department as not being "representative of the bank's
ordinary portfolio of outstanding customer loans," 116 pursuant to section 9
of Revenue Ruling 68-630.117 The Tax Court reversed the determination of
the Commissioner. 118
Section 166(c) of the IRC provides that, "in the discretion of the
Secretary or his delegate," a reasonable addition may be made to a reserve
for bad debts. ' 19 The issue before the Seventh Circuit in First National Bank
was therefore "whether the Commissioner's view is reasonable rather than
whether the taxpayer's view is reasonable."1 20 The court first disposed of
the bank's argument that section 9 of the Revenue Ruling was not an
independent basis for excluding loans from the loan basis in determining the
bad debt reserve. Rather than constituting a catch-all paragraph intending to
summarize exclusions set forth in sections 3 through 8 of the Ruling, the
court agreed with a recent decision of the Tax Court1 21 that "Section 9
constitutes a separate ground for exclusion of loans from a bank's loan base
beyond those exclusions set forth in earlier Sections of that Ruling."
1 22
In affirming the determination of the Commissioner to exclude the
advances to the Trust Department from the loan base, the court placed great
emphasis on the facts that the Commercial Loan Department neither re-
ceived notes nor charged interest, that the bank made no profit on the
advances and that there were no losses incurred by the bank for the taxable
year in question with respect to the advances. 123 All the foregoing items led
the Seventh Circuit to conclude that there was no "element of risk" in the
loans from the Commercial Loan Department to the Trust Department, and
since no losses could be anticipated with respect to the loans, no additions to
the reserve for bad debts could be computed taking such loans into account.
116. 546 F.2d at 761.
117. Section 9 of Revenue Ruling 68-630 provides:
A bank may compute the addition to its reserve for bad debts on the basis of loans
outstanding at the close of its taxable year, except that any loan outstanding on such
date that is not representative of the bank's ordinary portfolio of outstanding customer
loans must be excluded from the loan base. If a loan is entered into or acquired for the
purpose (whether or not it is the primary purpose) of enlarging the otherwise available
bad debt deduction, it will be presumed that the loan resulting from such transaction is
not representative of the bank's ordinary portfolio of outstanding customer loans.
Rev. Rul. 68-630 at § 9.
118. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1001 (1975).
119. See IRC § 166(c).
120. 546 F.2d at 761.
121. Industrial Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 272 (1976).
122. 546 F.2d at 762.
123. Id. at 762-63.
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WHEN IS A RETURN "FILED"
In Hotel Equities Corp. v. Commissioner,124 the corporate taxpayer's
return was due on July 15, 1970. On July 14, 1970, the return was
mailed, being received by the IRS on July 17, 1970. Exactly three years
from the date of receipt of the return, the IRS mailed to the taxpayer a
statutory notice of deficiency for the year 1970. The sole issue before the
Seventh Circuit was whether section 7502125 defined the time when a tax
return was "filed" for purposes of section 6501(a).
126
Inasmuch as section 6501(a) proscribes the imposition of an assessment
unless made within three years after the filing of the return, the assessment
was untimely if the return was filed on the date of mailing, rather than the
date of receipt. The Seventh Circuit read the language of section
7502(a)(1) 127 literally, finding that: "[W]hen a document required to be
filed by a prescribed date (such as the tax return in the instant case) is
properly mailed, it will be deemed delivered (i.e. filed) on the date of its
mailing.' 128
The Commissioner conceded that section 7502 controlled in determin-
ing whether a timely return was filed to avoid an addition to a tax129 or to
determine whether a deadline prescribed by law for filing a claim for refund
was timely. The Commissioner's argument, that section 7502 did not apply
when determining whether a return was filed for purposes of triggering the
running of the statute of limitations, was a distinction the court found not to
be borne out by either logic or congressional intent. 130
"MARRIAGE PENALTY" UPHELD
In Barter v. United States,131 the Seventh Circuit rejected an attack by
married taxpayers on those provisions of the IRC which impose higher tax
124. 546 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1976).
125. IRC § 7502.
126. IRC § 6501(a).
127. Section 7502(a)(1) of the IRC provides:
If any return, claim, statement, or other document required to be filed, or any
payment required to be made, within a prescribed period or on or before a prescribed
date under authority of any provision of the internal revenue laws is, after such period
or such date, delivered by United States mail to the agency, officer, or office with
which such return, claim, statement or other document is required to be filed, or to
which such payment is required to be made, the date of the United States postmark
stamped on the cover in which such return, claim, statement, or other document, or
payment, is mailed shall be deemed to be the date of delivery or the date of payment,
as the case may be.
IRC § 7502(a)(1).
128. 546 F.2d at 728.
129. Id. at 726-27.
130. Id. at 729.
131. 550 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3436 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1978) (No.
77-490).
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rates "on the taxable income of a married person whose spouse has signifi-
cant income than on the same taxable income of an unmarried per-
son." 132 The taxpayers claimed a constitutional infringement of their rights
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment and the rights of association in marriage
under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments.' 33 The
Seventh Circuit found no constitutional proscription against such disparity
in treatment, and specifically noted that: "[P]erfect equality or absolute
logical consistency between persons subject to the Internal Revenue Code
has been, at least since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, a
constitutional sine qua non." 1
34
VALUATION OF ARGENTINE PESOS
In a published opinion without any apparent precedential value, the
Seventh Circuit in Durovic v. Commissioner,' 35 affirmed a decision of the
Tax Court, 136 calculating the exchange rate for Argentine pesos on January
26, 1950. The first issue in the case involved the need for a determination as
to the rate of exchange was a result of Durovic's importation of the drug
Krebiozen from Argentina in 1950 and its subsequent contribution to a
partnership with his brother. Income tax deficiencies had been assessed
against Durovic and the accuracy of the assessments rested upon his basis in
the partnership. In the second issue before the court, Durovic claimed that
his distribution free of cost of some 60,000 ampules of the drug was
deductible as either an advertising expense or an amortizable capital expen-
diture. The Seventh Circuit again agreed with the Tax Court, disallowing
the deduction, and found that neither characterization applied to the distribu-
tion of the ampules.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL
No SOLACE TO TAXPAYER
In United States v. Mapp, 37 the taxpayer was indicted and convicted
for tax evasion.' 38 A substantial portion of the government's case relied
upon statements taken from Mapp by both revenue agents from the Audit
Division and special agents from the Intelligence Division of the IRS. The
district court judge initially granted the defendant's motion to suppress his
132. Id. at 1240.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. 1, IV, V, IX & X.
134. 550 F.2d at 1240.
135. 542 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1976).
136. 65 T.C. 480 (1976).
137. 561 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1977).
138. IRC § 7201.
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statements, based on prior decisions of the Seventh Circuit in United States
v. Dickerson,139 and United States v. Oliver.14° While the government's
appeal of the suppression order was pending, the United States Supreme
Court decided Beckwith v. United States,14' causing a remand of the case
from the court of appeals back to the district court, which reversed the
suppression order. 14 2 In Beckwith, the Supreme Court held that Miranda 1
4 3
warnings need not be provided to a taxpayer under investigation by the IRS
for potential criminal violations unless the taxpayer is in a custodial situa-
tion. Because the interviews of Mapp were conducted at his tavern, and not
in inherently coercive surroundings, the court found that Mapp had not been
deprived "of his freedom of action in a significant way" 1" and that no
warnings were required.
Of primary importance in Mapp was the holding of the Seventh Circuit
that the rules and regulations contained in the IRS Agents handbook were
"adopted for the internal administration of the service and not for the
protection of the taxpayer, and they, therefore, conferred no rights on the
taxpayer." 14 Mapp had argued that the IRS regulations required special
agents to advise taxpayers under investigation for potential criminal viola-
tions of their Miranda warnings. 146 The decision of the Seventh Circuit that
Mapp could not avail himself of administrative rules imposed upon IRS
employees was consistent with the findings of the Tenth Circuit.
47
CONCLUSION
Whether the taxpayers will ultimately prevail in two of the most
important cases decided by the Seventh Circuit this past term should be
determined this year by the United States Supreme Court. In both LaSalle
National Bank and In re Sotelo, the Supreme Court granted writs of
certiorari, the cases have been argued and are awaiting decision. With
thirteen written opinions rendered, the 1976-1977 term was certainly one of
the most prolific of the Seventh Circuit in the area of taxation.
139. 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
140. 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974).
141. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
142. See 561 F.2d at 687 for a discussion of the district court decision.
143. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
144. 561 F.2d at 688.
145. Id. at 690.
146. [1968] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6946; [1967] 8 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
5709.
147. United States v. Lockyer, 448 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 1971).
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